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ABSTRACT 
Purpose – Activist groups apply a range of tactics in order to improve labour conditions 
in the global sports  and  apparel  industry.  The  accumulation  of these tactics  leads to 
the  build-up of pressure on firms within this industry (brands, retailers) to change 
their policies and activities on labour issues in their supply chains. The purpose of this 
paper is to explore how activist groups instigate change within an industry. 
Design/methodology/approach – By re-examining a series of previously published  
accounts, eight  conflict situations  in the global sports  and  apparel  industry,  
involving Nike, Reebok and Adidas, were analysed. 
Findings – The paper demonstrates  how an industry-level approach is helpful in 
understanding how the sequential patterning of tactical choices evokes change in an 
industry.  Studying activist groups’ tactics from this approach provides a richer 
understanding. 
Originality/value  –  The  paper  contributes  to  the  growing  literature  on  activists’  
influence strategies  in  conflicts with  firms  and  speaks  to  current  attempts  at  
bringing  together  social movement and organization theories. 
Keywords: Conflict, Industrial relations, Garment industry, Supply chain anagement 
Paper type:  Research paper 
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1 INTRODUCTION1 
Activist groups have become important stakeholders to business organizations. By 
making all sorts of claims on what firms should or should not do, and leveraging these 
through a variety of tactics, they seek to influence corporate policies and practices on 
issues relating to what they believe are the social or environmental responsibilities of 
firms. Often they do so without recourse to the law or state (‘‘private politics’’, Baron, 
2003). Scholarly attention  to the  relationships  between activist  groups  and  firms 
concerning social and environmental issues has gained considerable interest in the 
organization, management, and social movement literatures (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 
2003; Smith, 2005; den Hond and de Bakker,  2007; Soule, 2009). The reason for such 
increased interest is not only empirical. The challenge is to understand how activist 
groups, which are commonly viewed as being endowed with less power than their 
corporate opponents, are nevertheless sometimes able to affect considerable changes in 
corporate practices (de Bakker and den Hond, 2008). Although the activist groups’ 
repertoires of tactics have been explored in the corporate context (e.g. Schurman, 
2004; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Soule, 2009) there is a lack of insight into how 
activist groups  sequentially  apply  their  tactics  to  evoke institutional  change  within  
an industry. 
There are four reasons why we explore the potential of an industry-level approach to 
studying conflicts between activist groups and firms. First, activist groups often operate 
in networks (Diani and McAdam,  2003). To understand the full potential of 
movements, studying the strategic interplay within these networks is useful.  
Activist groups,  for instance, may coordinate protest campaigns across geographically 
distant areas, e.g. in the timing of protest events and in the framing of issues, as is 
discussed in the literature on transnational activist networks (Bandy and Smith, 2005; 
Tarrow, 2005). Because of such coordination the density of the activist group’s network 
                                                        
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at several conferences, including the 2006 ECPR Joint 
Workshop Sessions, the 2007 EGOS Colloquium, and the 2007 Academy of Management Conference. The 
authors should like to thank Maria Dijkstra, Brayden King, Michelle Micheletti, and Marshall Scott Poole 
for their useful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper 
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increases, which in turn is likely to enhance the efficacy of their pressure (Rowley, 
1997). Further, by collaborating activist groups may claim to act on behalf of a 
significantly greater constituency than when working alone, thus  adding to the 
legitimacy of their claim (DeNardo, 1985). Finally, by pooling their strategic 
orientations and related expertise in particular protest tactics, their campaigns may 
gain clout as – metaphorically speaking – their struggle is fought with different 
weapons. 
Second, activist groups are often more interested in changing the conditions within an 
industry than in bringing about change in particular firms (Lounsbury et al., 2003; 
Zald et al., 2005). Both collaboration and confrontation with firms can be instrumental 
in getting closer to this overall ambition for institutional change. So far, there has been 
only limited empirical evidence to support the claim that activist groups aim for any 
industry-level change when they challenge or work with firms, as scholarly attention 
has privileged dyadic relationships between individual activist groups and individual 
firms (Hartman and Stafford, 1997; Livesey, 1999). 
Third, activist groups’ tactical choices in challenging an industry are likely to change 
over time; the sequential patterning of tactics for targeting firms over time therefore 
needs further attention. The social movement literature can be helpful, as the 
patterning of activist tactics has often been studied (e.g. McAdam,  1983; Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001). However, many of such analyses were conducted in a public policy 
context, whereas activist group pressure against firms has developed into an 
international, perhaps even global, phenomenon (Smith, 2004; Tarrow, 2005) 
addressing topics and issues that are beyond the immediate influence of national 
governments. 
Finally, studies of activist tactics often highlight the adoption of new strategies and 
tactics. Fewer analyses have been devoted to their sequential adoption over time and to 
their adoption at the movement level of analysis (Minkoff, 1997;  King and Cornwall, 
2005).  Studying activism at the industry  level over time therefore also provides an 
opportunity to uncover ways activists learn from all earlier experiences had at that 
level. 
Drawing on social movement and inter-organizational conflict theories, we seek to 
understand  the patterning of activist groups’ tactical choices over time in evoking 
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industry change. Using a wide variety of data, we study how activist groups applied 
different tactics in eight conflict situations (cases) in different Asian countries, each of 
which involving one of three leading companies in the global sports and apparel 
industry: Nike, adidas[1], and Reebok. Activist pressure built up across the eight cases, 
suggesting how the accumulation of activism led to an increase of pressure to change 
policies and activities on labour issues in the industry’s international supply chains. For 
each case we extracted a chronology of events and identified: 
• whether the activist group mainly aimed to delegitimize existing practices, or 
to help the firm find improvements; 
• what tactics were employed; and 
• what the preceding and following moves of the firm were. 
Then, we analysed the cases both separately and in conjunction, at the industry level, to 
conclude that the latter approach provides a richer and more insightful explanation of 
activist groups’ attempts at instigating industry change. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Conflict between activist groups and firms 
Because in the literature little attention has been given to inter-organizational 
conflict[2], we build on the more general organizational conflict literature (e.g. Lewicki 
et al., 1992; Wall and Callister, 1995). Wall and Callister (1995, p. 517) see conflict as ‘‘a 
process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively 
affected by another party’’. Similarly, in this study, we define conflict as a situation in 
which the activist group and the firm have different evaluations of the nature and 
consequences of the firm’s operations. 
For example, a firm might offshore production to low-wage  countries in order to 
reduce costs. Further cost reductions might result in poor labour conditions, including 
– but not limited to – below subsistence payments, hazardous working conditions, 
denial of the right to unionize, sexual harassment of female workers, or the use of child 
labour. Local workers and, through their embeddedness in transnational activist 
networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), activist groups in European and North-American 
markets, could well consider such consequences unacceptable. If this is the case, a 
conflict is born. On the one side of the conflict are local workers and their activist allies 
and on the other side is the firm (brand or retailer) and its supply network. Often, a 
local conflict is transferred to the transnational level in a move of scale shift (Tarrow, 
2005; Soule, 2009), thus creating a ‘‘corporate boomerang’’ (Armbruster-Sandoval, 
2004). In this move, the conflict becomes ‘‘strategic’’ (Pondy, 1969) as the activist 
group’s ambition of social change is likely to have profound and long-lasting 
consequences for the organizational structures  within the challenged firm and its 
supply network. 
Although collaboration often has been proposed as the preferred solution to inter- 
organizational conflict, sometimes confrontation is deliberately chosen (Hardy and 
Phillips, 1998); confrontation and collaboration are two strategies  that  parties in a 
conflict may both draw upon in playing out their conflict. 
2.2 An industry-level approach 
How can activist groups instigate change within an industry  if recourse to law or 
government regulation is unavailable as a lever for change? We distinguish firm-level 
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and industry-level approaches to analyse how activist groups try to do so, and propose 
that the latter provides a richer understanding.  
In the firm-level approach, activist groups are seen as articulating a particular conflict 
by challenging target firms individually,  in order to convert them to their preferred 
position. Although some mimetic diffusion of their preferred conflict solution 
throughout the industry may occur, this is not the central focus of analysis. 
Institutional change is explained as aggregate outcome of a series of fairly isolated, 
unconnected dyadic conflicts. Several studies on the outcomes of activism are based on 
such a conceptualization of the conflict between activist groups and firms (e.g. Eesley 
and Lenox, 2006; Zadek, 2004). However, these studies often ignore the possible 
interaction between separate individual, dyadic conflicts (den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007). 
In the industry-level approach, activist groups are seen as targeting firms in the light of 
their broader ambition to affect the entire industry. By framing and articulating the 
conflict as a broader problem than one concerning a particular firm, activist groups not 
only hope to make their claim more legitimate, but also to broaden the playing field. 
This allows them more degrees of freedom in deciding how to proceed with their 
campaigns, e.g. in finding allies, pooling resources and expertise, and coordinating 
protest events in distant areas, as argued also in research on transnational activism (see 
Bandy and Smith, 2005). The conflict is seen as more extended in its scope, both over 
time and geographically.  How one firm is challenged is related to how other firms have 
been challenged before, to the challenged firms’ responses, e.g. in their ability to 
neutralize a challenge, and also to the activist groups’ expectations of the effect of 
earlier conflicts on other members of the industry. The focus of the industry-level 
analysis is on the coordination of activist groups’ actions at a broader level and over 
time. 
To investigate our suggestion, we not only need to show that the industry-level 
approach results in a plausible explanation of activist group campaigns, but also that 
the alternative, i.e. that the historical pattern can be understood as the accumulation of 
a series of unconnected conflicts, is  less  plausible. To  that  end  we analyse  the 
sequential patterning of different activist groups’ tactics over time in eight conflict 
situations. To do so, we first need to develop a dynamic conceptualization of the conflict 
between activist groups and firms. 
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2.3 Conflict dynamics 
Building on della Porta and Diani (1999), den Hond and de Bakker (2007) proposed a 
classification of anti-corporate tactics as applied by activist groups. Because of the 
firm’s profit motive, the potential efficacy of activist tactics can be understood to 
depend on their consequences to the firm’s bottom line, either directly at the material 
level (e.g.  affecting a  firm’s cost  or  revenue), or  indirectly  at  the  symbolic  level (e.g. 
affecting a firm’s reputation). The impact of tactics may be beneficial to the firm, 
providing a positive incentive for change, or it may harm the firm, damage its interests, 
and thus provide a negative incentive. Further, activist tactics can be distinguished by 
the extent to which their efficacy does or does not depend on the participation of a large 
number of people (respectively mass participation tactics and elite participation  
tactics). These dimensions describe different types of tactics; we consider this 
classification as particularly apt for our analysis. 
Firms often respond to activist group tactics[3]. Several categorizations of firm 
responses have been proposed (Thomas, 1992; Oliver, 1991). For analytical purposes, 
we group firm responses into two clusters: positive and negative. Firms choosing 
positive responses (e.g. collaboration, accommodation, acquiescence, compromise)  
signal that they are open to engage with the activist groups’ demands. Firms choosing 
negative responses (e.g. avoidance, competition, defiance, manipulation) seek to avert 
them. 
Conflict is a sequence of action-response episodes (Wall and Callister, 1995): short 
periods of time in which a firm responds to an activist group tactic. Usually, several 
episodes can be distinguished  in a conflict (Pondy, 1992; Thomas, 1992). Whether 
additional episodes are created, that is, how a conflict evolves over time, depends on 
decisions by both parties in the conflict. The conflict is resolved, either directly by 
concession or with some delay due to compromising; it is continued, because the firm’s 
response is considered inadequate by the activist group or because the firm decides not 
to give into the claims; or it is abandoned, as the activist group decides no longer to 
pursue its challenge to the firm. By analysing different conflict episodes at the industry 
The global sports apparel industry level, we can trace the build-up of efforts by activist 
groups to change a prevailing standards and practices. In the type of conflict we 
analyse,  activist groups typically start  off using elite participation tactics aimed at 
having a symbolic impact (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007); they inform the firm that a 
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certain violation of labour rights has taken place and require remedial action to be 
taken. This gives the challenged firm the option to work with the  activist  group,  and  
is  cost-effective and  risk-free to  the  activist  group. However, upon repeated negative 
responses, activist groups will start using tactics that require mass participation for 
their efficacy (e.g. demonstrations), or that aim to make a material impact (e.g. 
boycotts). Such tactics are more resource intensive and risky. For example, it can be 
difficult for activist groups to mobilize large numbers of people to join protest events, 
and making a material impact on the firm, such as through a boycott, may result in a 
part of the activist group’s constituency deciding to withdraw its support. The lack of 
progress in conflict settlement may however provide a justification to use alternative 
tactics. 
Continuation of conflict may result in escalation in various ways. The scope of the 
conflict may be broadened, either in terms of the locus of conflict, or in terms of the 
number of different actors participating in the conflict. Alternatively, the pacing of the 
conflict may increase, as actions and responses follow one upon another at a quicker 
rhythm (Tarrow, 1994). Finally, the means by which the actors involved seek to end the 
conflict change, usually by progressively choosing more resource intensive and risky 
tactics: including mass  participation  tactics  with  symbolic impact (such as 
demonstrations), mass participation tactics with material impact (such as boycotts), 
and eventually elite participation tactics with material impact (such as sabotage) (den 
Hond and de Bakker, 2007). As the application of this latter set of tactics may 
jeopardize public support for the activists’ cause, we expect that such tactics are only 
rarely found. Conflict endures until one of the actors involved ‘‘surrenders’’ or leaves 
the conflict[4], or until a settlement is agreed upon that is acceptable to both actors. 
These dynamics can be summarized as follows:  
• Early  in the conflict, activist  groups  select elite participation  tactics with a 
symbolic impact. 
• The conflict is ended upon the challenged firm’s positive response. 
• The conflict continues and eventually escalates upon the challenged firm’s 
negative response. 
• Upon escalation, activist groups expand their choice of tactics by selecting, 
first, mass participation tactics with symbolic impact, then, mass participation 
tactics with material impact, and eventually, elite participation tactics with 
material impact. 
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We analyse conflict as episodes of action and response in cases that are drawn from the 
widely publicized conflict between the anti-sweatshop movement and firms in the 
global sports apparel industry over worker rights and other labour issues. If the firm- 
level approach were the proper lens to understand the conflict, we would observe highly 
similar patterns of action and response in each case. Escalation would occur in terms of 
changing tactics within each separate case; each case would go through the same cycle 
of protest and be confronted with the same sequence of tactics. The alternative of 
analysing the conflict by the industry-level approach would suggest that escalation of 
the conflict would occur both within and across cases, and moreover that the 
developments in different cases are linked in the sense that understanding what 
happens in one conflict situation depends on understanding  what happens in other 
cases. 
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3 DATA AND  METHOD 
We selected the global sports  apparel industry  because of its fairly high level of 
concentration, keeping the research project manageable in terms of the number of 
firms that  could be challenged. Data collection took place in 2004; it covers the period 
between 1988 and 2002. 
Our choice to make use of secondary data – articles, case studies and other reports –is 
motivated by the large number of publications readily available. However, our 
approach is not to be confused with a research literature review as our objective was to 
comprehensively outline the history of the interaction between activist groups and the 
targeted firms, rather than to compare and contrast the results of individual studies. 
Among the 47 publications we used are 19 academic journal articles, six research 
reports, nine teaching cases, and 13 books and book chapters. We found them through 
keyword searches in bibliographic databases as well as the internet. Many treatises of 
activist challenges to firms in the global sports apparel industry  were designed as 
dyadic case studies. Inclusion in this study was decided on the basis of the level of 
detail in describing the conflict. We deliberately included studies of various 
epistemological orientations, in order to balance any possible biases that might have 
intruded in individual studies because of their specific objectives and approaches. 
We analysed our data by closely reading all the materials we gathered, aimed at 
identifying events: a firm or an activist group doing something in a particular place, at a 
particular time. We collected these events in a spreadsheet and sorted them by date, 
leading to an initial data matrix. We combined similar events that were retrieved from 
different sources into a single record, resulting in a database of about 1,100 events. 
Table I provides a short timeline of the conflicts. Our material suggested that several 
conflict situations could be identified in different geographical regions; various conflict 
situations were discussed in only one or two publications. We decided not to include 
these in our analysis, as we wanted to triangulate the data underlying the individual 
case descriptions and thereby correct for potential errors and omissions. We chose to 
further analyse the eight conflict situations that were most widely covered. All these 
conflicts were located in Asia, an area where a large share of the World’s production of 
sports apparel is being produced. Three firms – Nike, Reebok, and adidas – were 
involved in these eight conflict situations[5]. 
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4 RESULTS 
Activist groups  started   their  campaigning  in  the  sports  apparel  industry by 
challenging Nike, the industry leader. As of 1988, the Asian American Free Labor 
Institute, in the person of Jeff Ballinger, executed extensive field research in Indonesia, 
and found many labour rights violations. Other groups conducted similar research. 
They found that companies in Nike’s supply network were among the worst offenders 
(Bullert, 2000), and tried to get media attention for their results. Hence, research and 
media attention – examples of elite participation tactics aimed at having a symbolic 
impact – were the tactics initially used. 
Nike’s response was  negative in claiming that the firm could not control the production 
processes of its many suppliers and that low wages were part of the firm’s growth 
strategy. Continuing media attention led to the firm adopting a code of conduct 
Table 1 Short timeline of events and their context 
Year  Event 
1970s, 1980s Western companies discover the advantages of outsourcing 
production to developing countries 
1988-1992 Jeff Ballinger conducts extensive field research on labour 
conditions at Indonesian suppliers to Western sports 
apparel brands 
1991 Levi Strauss and Co. is the first corporation in the apparel 
and footwear industry to establish comprehensive global 
sourcing and operating guidelines, after it uncovered 
violations of workers’ human rights in their Chinese 
contractors in the late 1980s 
1992 Articles begin to appear in newspapers and magazines 
(notably Ballinger’s article in Harper’s magazine) 
The Olympic Games provide the occasion for various 
instances of activism Nike is the second corporation in the 
apparel and footwear industry to adopt a code of conduct 
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1996 Ballinger (Press for Change) and Medea Benjamin (Global 
Exchange) join forces Under the tutelage of the Clinton 
administration, the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) is 
established. Nike is among the founding members 
1997 Adidas establishes ‘‘Standards of Engagement’’ (updated in 
2001), after the company, as well as Nike and Reebok, has 
been criticized for the use of child labour in the production 
of soccer balls in Pakistan 
1998 Nike publicly accepts responsibility for many of the issues 
facing its suppliers 
1999 AIP is transformed into the Fair Labor Association 
Adidas, as well as Nike and Pentland, face the issue of 
substandard  occupational health and safety situations in 
Vietnamese suppliers 
World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle 
2000  Worker Rights Consortium is founded 
2001 Adidas starts publishing an annual Social and  nvironmental 
Report 
2004 Clean clothes campaign (CCC), Oxfam, and Global Union
 start the Fair Play campaign in the six months 
prior to the Olympic Games. The focus is on companies that 
until then had escaped scrutiny, such as Asics, Fila, Kappa, 
Lotto, Mizuno, Puma, and Umbro Ending of Multi Fiber 
Agreement 
2005 Nike, Reebok, and Puma disclose the names and addresses 
of several of their suppliers 
2006 Oxfam publishes a report on the labour rights at Asian 
suppliers of Reebok, Adidas, Nike, and several other well-
known brands 
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in 1992. The code was received by activist groups as impression management. For 
example, it was not communicated to workers in their own languages. In the early 
1990s, a real media campaign slowly emerged, including the inversion of Nike 
advertisements  (‘‘culture   jamming’’)   and  the  opposition  of  Indonesian  workers’ 
earnings and those of Michael Jordan by promoting Nike. Although Nike revised its 
code and hired external parties to certify that its contractors were really following all 
the  local labour  laws  (e.g.  Wokutch, 2001), it  also negated  allegations  and 
responsibilities. This pattern of interaction – elite participation tactics aimed at having 
a symbolic impact and negative responses – remained unchanged until the mid-1990s. 
After 1995, the campaign became more organized and better resourced, notably by the 
entry of Global Exchange into the conflict. This helped the activist groups to escalate 
the conflict (Bullert, 2000): it was picked up in the mass media, thus creating 
something of a hype, and the first demonstrations and boycotts (examples of mass 
participation tactics aimed at having, respectively, symbolic and material impacts) were 
being organized (Hendry, 2000). Moreover, the campaign was also being organized in 
Europe and Australia. When Nike entered Vietnam in 1995, the conflict’s geographical 
scope was expanded beyond Indonesia, by activists’ immediate scrutiny of Nike’s 
Vietnamese supply chain. The data suggest that both the activist groups and Nike 
considered the two loci of confrontation to be part of the same conflict. For instance, 
when in 1997 Nike invited a well-reputed consultant to independently investigate its 
factories and evaluate its code of conduct for relations with third-world producers, he 
was invited to do so in Indonesia, Vietnam, and China (e.g. Goldman  and Papson, 
1998; Santoro, 2003). 
Despite its adherence, in 1996, to the Clinton administration’s initiative of the Apparel 
Industry Partnership, as one of the first companies to do so, Nike’s approach really did 
not change until 1998, following the results of an internal study concluding that a major 
explanation for the continuation of the conflict was the company’s underlying business 
model, which provided incentives with consequences contrary to the objectives and 
principles of its code of conduct (Bullert, 2000). Although Nike became more 
constructive in how it addressed the issues, e.g. by increasingly engaging in 
collaboration with various NGOs and competitors Reebok and adidas (Arnold and 
Hartman,  2003), there  is  also  a  continuing  scrutiny,  and  critique,  of the  labour 
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conditions of its  suppliers  (e.g.  Conner and  Dent, 2006). In  the  early  2000s, the 
campaign’s focus shifted towards installing the mechanisms that help improve the 
situation of workers, e.g. by demanding disclosure of the names of the firm’s suppliers. 
In October 1990, The New York Times published one of the first reports on Pakistani 
boys stitching soccer balls. Adidas was mentioned, but the article did not attract much 
attention. This changed after the 1994 World Cup organized in the USA. Investigations 
in Pakistan and media coverage of labour conditions associated adidas, as well as Nike, 
Reebok, and other brands, with violations of child labour standards in the production 
of soccer balls. Years 1995 and 1996 saw additional research, media campaigning,  and 
demonstrations (elite and mass participation tactics with symbolic impact), as well as 
the organization of boycotts (mass participation tactics with material impact) (Khan et 
al., 2007; Schrage, 2004). The case of adidas in China is an extension of the Pakistan 
case, as the firm transferred some production to China. It was accused that forced 
labour by prisoners was in the production. In 1996, adidas entered Vietnam for the 
production of shoes. In 1999, the spotlight turned on the company (Winstanley et al., 
2002). Multiple tactics were being used simultaneously, as in the Pakistan case. 
Adidas’ responses in the Pakistan  and  Vietnam cases differ significantly from Nike’s 
responses: it consistently framed the problem as an industry-wide problem. Nike only 
did this occasionally. Whereas Nike’s initial response was a combination of denial of 
facts and denial of responsibility, adidas’ response was ambiguous in expressing both 
concern and denial of its ability to change the situation. However, after Nike’s 
‘‘surrender’’ in June 1998, adidas became significantly more constructive in Pakistan. 
Other protests aimed at adidas however were less fruitful. In the two conflicts in China 
reference was made to the company’s code of conduct, but the activist groups dropped 
both conflicts. In Vietnam, a solution was being crafted in December 1999, when adidas 
started working with the ‘‘Vietnam Footwear Industry Business Links Initiative’’. 
Reebok took several initiatives to show its commitment to human rights as early as 
1988,  e.g.  by establishing  a human  rights  department, collaborating with Amnesty 
International, granting an annual ‘‘Human Rights Award’’ to young activists who had 
made significant contributions to human rights causes through nonviolent means[6], 
and adopting a code of conduct in 1992 (Gupta and Prashanth, 2002). However,  
although Reebok received less criticism than Nike in the early 1990s, such 
commitments did not make the company immune to activism. In 1992 activist groups 
challenged Reebok for the labour conditions among its Indonesian suppliers. Positive 
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responses and further accusations provided the scenario for the Indonesian conflict. 
Escalation took place in 1996, when several activist groups disturbed Reebok’s annual 
‘‘Human Rights Award’’ ceremony. In addition to using different tactics, they 
broadened the geographical scope of the accusations to also include China, although 
the dynamics of the Chinese conflict were somewhat different. Initially, Reeboks 
responses were more negative in China than in Indonesia; it took until 1999 before 
Reebok started to develop the sort of collaborations with activist groups and other 
Chinese actors that eventually ended the conflict. 
Although our analysis of the events stops at the end of 2002 – a consequence of our 
data  collection in 2004 – further  developments have been observed, including the 
gradual rise of disagreement about strategic choices among the network of activist 
groups, a developing focus in investigations to include the supply chain conditions of 
the majority of players in the industry (Merk, 2005; Conner and Dent, 2006), and also 
to include other suppliers in other countries, such as Sri Lanka and Thailand (Conner 
and Dent, 2006). Further, on 31 December 2004, the Multi-Fiber Agreement expired, 
which had regulated the trade in garments through export quota for a period of some 
40 years; this expiration gave rise to concerns about brands having more opportunities 
to shift  production across countries and  thereby escape scrutiny.  In 2005, Nike and 
Reebok disclosed the names and addresses on many of their suppliers, providing some 
more transparency in their supply chains. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Figure 1 summarizes our findings.  If our conceptualization of the dynamics of the 
conflict between activist groups and firms is correct, then the sequence of tactics is a 
suitable indicator of the level at which the conflict is to be understood. If the conflict is 
firm and location specific,  e.g. if it is about labour conditions in Nike’s Indonesian 
 
Figure 1 Overview of tactics applied in eight different conflicts 
supply chain only, then the escalation of conflict is to be observed at this level. If on the 
other hand, the conflict is played out at the industry level, then escalation must be 
observed across firms and geographical locations. As Figure 1 shows, the latter appears 
to be the case. 
Our findings do not match our conceptualization when considered at the firmlevel of 
analysis. For example, in several instances (conflicts 4, 5, 6, and 8, involving adidas and 
Reebok)  activist  groups  initiated  conflict by applying  not only elite participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
tactics aimed at symbolic impact, but also mass participation tactics aimed at symbolic 
influence, and in one case (conflict 5, involving adidas) even mass participation tactics 
aimed at material impact. Further, as conflict 8 (involving Reebok) most clearly shows, 
positive responses by a firm may lead to less confrontational, if not collaborative, 
episodes in the conflict but do not necessarily put an end to the conflict. When, by 1996, 
several activist  groups  believed that  Reebok had  not made sufficient progress  in 
improving labour conditions among its Indonesian suppliers (conflict 7), escalation 
occurred by applying mass participation tactics with symbolic impact. Perhaps its prior 
positive responses ‘‘protected’’ this firm from being exposed to activism (or perhaps the 
activist groups lacked the resources required to make the case), but still the conflict 
escalated. Although Reebok’s early responses might be interpreted as a spill-over effect 
from the challenges Nike faced, the timing of escalation in both cases is strikingly 
similar, and therefore suggests some coordination between the two cases. 
Activist groups apparently chose to first challenge Nike, the industry leader, as they 
considered it impossible to challenge all firms simultaneously. Hoping for diffusion of 
their message throughout the industry initially seemed to be an effective strategy, as 
Global Exchange makes clear:  
By targeting the industry leader, we hoped to make changes throughout the whole industry. This 
strategy has proven effective. Reebok, for example, has been making improvements in its 
overseas factories even though it has not been the target of a major campaign.  
(Global Exchange, 2006). 
However, Reebok was challenged – albeit not to the same degree as Nike – during the 
early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, the campaign changed to simultaneously challenging 
multiple brands in multiple locations. This was partly associated to Nike and Adidas 
shifting production to other countries and partly to the general public in Western 
markets gaining interest in labour issues after activist groups had been pushing them 
for some time. Figure 1 also shows how after 1995 the conflict escalated along three 
dimensions: 
1) an increased use of tactics (both in number and type of tactics); 
2) the  shaping  of new conflicts aimed  at  the  same  actor  but  at  a  different 
geographical location; and 
3) the shaping of new conflicts aimed at other actors within the industry. 
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Hence, would this  latter  conceptualization provide a better  fit when the conflict is 
analysed at the industry-level of analyses? We re-examine our data, by looking at the 
dynamics of conflict as aggregated over the set of eight cases, rather than at the cases 
individually. For instance, an interesting pattern can be identified in Figure 1, 
concerning the use of tactics by activist groups. It should be noted that between 1988 
and 1995, activist groups only deployed elite participation tactics aimed at having a 
symbolic impact to change the behaviour of these firms. Also striking is the fact that 
during this period only two conflicts arose (conflicts 1 and 7). Both Nike and Reebok 
were confronted with criticism on labour conditions in their Indonesian facilities, but 
whereas the interaction with Nike was confrontational, with Reebok it was more 
collaborative. We will discuss the different periods distinguished in Figure 1 in more 
detail to underline the relevance of taking an industry-level approach to understand the 
conflict. 
First, as shown in Figure 1, from 1995 onwards, activist groups have deployed more and 
more diverse tactics, sometimes in combination, to influence firms in the global sports 
apparel industry. Activist groups are exerting pressure on firms more frequently after 
1995, no longer calling upon elite participation tactics with a symbolic impact only, but 
increasingly deploying mass participation tactics with a symbolic and even material 
impact to evoke change in corporate behaviour. Several years of informing the general 
public in Western markets about labour issues had made the public sufficiently aware 
and concerned that activist groups could build on it in their campaigns. In a sense, the 
opportunity for successfully deploying tactics that require mass participation for their 
success was created by the steady dissemination of information. 
Second, our results indicate that new conflicts developed that were aimed at the same 
actor but at a different geographical location. An example is the mutual influence 
between conflicts 1 and 2. Initially, Nike was only challenged in relation to labour 
conditions in the production facilities of the firm’s Indonesian suppliers. Yet, in 1995, 
the same activist group challenged Nike concerning labour conditions in factories of its 
Vietnamese suppliers. The conflict issue ‘‘labour conditions’’ apparently spread from 
Indonesia to Vietnam. A similar escalation can be seen in the Reebok cases (conflicts 7 
and 8). After a period of more than eight years in which activist groups only challenged 
Reebok regarding labour conditions in its Indonesian facilities, the company was also 
confronted with criticism on its Chinese subsidiaries. Geographical conflict escalation 
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occurred in relation to brands  seeking supplies from different locations, a common 
practice in this industry. 
Third, conflict escalation can also be observed when additional corporate actors are 
drawn into the conflict, thus broadening the conflict to the industry level. In the conflict 
literature it is acknowledged that when two parties become engaged in a conflict, fairly 
simple conflicts can become more and more complicated and that one initial conflict 
can give rise to the development of a series of conflicts (Wall and Callister, 1995). From 
Figure 1 it appears that between 1995 and 1999 such an extension of conflicts also took 
place. New conflict situations emerged, aimed at other actors, such as in conflicts 3-5 in 
which adidas is confronted with criticism concerning child labour in its Pakistan 
facilities and the dreadful labour conditions in its Chinese factories. 
Fourth, the escalation not only shows from a growing range of tactics being used by 
activist groups, and a broadening of the geographic and industry focus, but also from a 
change in the demands activist groups express through their actions. Initially, their 
demands focused on improvements of labour conditions, including wages and working 
hours. Later, occupational health and safety were added as important  elements of 
labour conditions; by the early 2000s, activist  groups  increasingly reframed their 
demands  in terms  of local workers’ rights  to negotiate fair labour conditions for 
themselves through unionization. Additionally, transparency in the organization of 
supply chains was increasingly demanded. 
By 1999 three conflicts  (3-5) seemed to be ended, thereby diminishing the intensity of 
the industry-level conflict. After 1999, the variety of tactics activist groups deployed 
decreased. As Figure 1 shows, between 1999 and 2002 only elite participation and mass 
participation tactics aimed at having a symbolic influence were applied. One 
explanation might be that  around that  time, a debate within the activist communities 
surfaced around the question of how to appreciate the moves Nike had made in 1998 
(Bullert, 2000). To some (e.g. Global Exchange) Nike’s moves were promising, to 
others (e.g. Press for Change), they were not substantial enough. The industry-level 
approach leads us to distinguish three stages in the conflict. The overture of the conflict 
is in the period 1988-1995; 1995-1999 is a period of escalation; and 1999-2002 is 
characterized by some settlement of the conflict as well as emerging controversy among 
the activist groups. 
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Presenting the conflicts in one figure allowed us to investigate the pattern across these 
separate conflicts. The pattern looks like a parabola: in the first stage of the conflict, 
activist groups deployed only a limited set of tactics that were not resource-intensive 
(elite participation tactics with a symbolic impact). In the second stage, a shift occurred 
towards activist groups using more resource intensive tactics such as mass 
participation tactics with a symbolic and material impact. Several new conflicts arose 
and more activist groups became engaged in the industry-level debate. During this 
stage the conflict escalated. Finally, in the third stage, the conflict attenuated, as there 
was a decrease in the deployment of different tactics and in the number of conflicts in 
the third stage of the industry-level conflict, leading to the use of elite and mass 
participation tactics with a symbolic impact only. This is related to concessions made by 
the challenged firms, as well as increased disagreement over the framing of the conflict 
among activist groups. 
After 2002 the conflict seems to have intensified again. In terms of our presentation of 
conflict dynamics (listed earlier), there is differentiation in how various activist groups 
appreciate the firms’ responses around the turn of the century; some activist groups 
stepped back from the campaign whereas others gained a more prominent role and new 
groups entered stage, the focus of the campaign shifted to ‘‘allow workers to organise  
trade  unions  and  bargain  collectively for better  wages  and  conditions’’ (Conner and  
Dent, 2006, p. 2), and  other companies that  until then had  remained relatively out of 
the spotlight were being targeted (Conner and Dent, 2006). It could be argued that a 
new ‘‘protest cycle’’ (Tarrow, 1994) had started, which on the one hand built on the 
previous and on the other hand was characterized by a new coalition of activist groups 
posing different claims on an expanded set of target firms (Table I). 
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6 IMPLICATIONS 
Our findings have several implications. Analysing the conflict from the industry level of 
analysis provides a better explanation for our findings than analysing it at the firm level 
of analysis. Looking beyond single events aimed at individual firms provides a richer 
and more comprehensive understanding of activist groups’ tactical choices. 
First, our analysis indicates that already in the first stages of conflict 2, activist groups 
turn to using a combination of elite participation and mass participation tactics with a 
symbolic impact. Right from the start of the conflict, Nike was confronted with mass 
participation tactics such as a boycott, demonstrations, and petitions. Taking a firm-
level approach makes it hard to understand  these results, as conflicts then are analysed 
one at a time. Taking  an industry-level view on these data  allows us to understand how 
conflict 2 is linked to conflict 1. Within both conflicts the same activist groups operate 
and the focal issue is identical in both episodes. Conflict 2 therefore indeed is an 
extension of conflict 1 and should therefore not be analysed independently. If conflicts 1 
and 2 are regarded as one continuing conflict, it appears that the activist groups 
initially only used elite participation tactics with a symbolic impact. Following these 
conflicts, in 1995 activist groups applied a combination of elite participation and mass 
participation tactics with a symbolic impact to influence Nike’s behaviour; later on a 
combination of elite participation  tactics with  a symbolic impact and  mass 
participation tactics with a symbolic and material impact was applied. This again 
supports our idea to view conflicts at an industry level. 
Second, our analysis also suggests that the targeting of Nike in 1988 influenced 
Reebok’s behaviour. The results show that, without any direct activist group pressure, 
Reebok took several measures to improve labour conditions in its Indonesian factories. 
This shows that the tactics with which activist groups tried to establish a change in 
Nike’s behaviour, unintended and indirectly also influenced Reebok’s  behaviour.  
Activist groups’ tactics aimed at a specific firm in some instances hence can also trigger 
unintended effects on other firms’ behaviour in the same industry. If, for instance, 
conflict 7 is analysed from a firm-level approach, it would be hard to understand why 
Reebok took measures to demonstrate its dedication to human rights issues already in 
1988. An industry-level approach, however, shows that there can be mutual influences 
between different conflicts; only an industry- level approach allows us to observe such 
patterns between different episodes. 
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Finally, such an approach also provides a possible explanation for understanding why 
activist groups already early in conflict 5 deployed a combination of elite participation 
tactics with a symbolic impact and mass participation tactics with a symbolic and  a 
material impact to influence adidas’ behaviour regarding  Chinese prisoners. Conflicts 4 
and 5 in principle are similar situations as conflicts 1 and 2 for Nike as in both cases the 
episodes could best be seen as an ongoing conflict. Although in conflicts 4 and 5 
different issues were at stake, both conflict episodes were centred on labour conditions 
in Chinese factories and prisons. Experiences in conflict 4 seem to have influenced the 
tactical choices of activists in conflict 5. 
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From our discussion, we conclude that an industry-level approach to understand  anti- 
corporate activism can generate additional insights. Our study of a broad range of 
conflicts and applied tactics within one industry over a longer period of time sheds light 
on the development of conflict within an industry. From Figure 1 it appeared that a 
pattern could be discerned in this industry-level conflict that fitted well with our 
conceptualization of conflict dynamics. Activist groups initially deployed elite 
participation tactics with a symbolic impact. When the conflict intensified, activist 
groups increasingly deployed more risky and resource intensive tactics. In addition, 
several new conflict episodes started and more activists entered the conflict. Finally, 
near the end of the industry-level conflict, activist groups seemed to deploy fewer 
tactics, while many conflicts were ended. Contrary to the results based on an analysis at 
the firm level, the industry-level analysis mainly supports the theoretically expected 
pattern. Additionally, the industry-level analysis allows us to focus on the dynamics and 
mutual influences between individual conflicts. 
This research suggests that taking a broader approach is useful in gaining purchase of 
activist groups’ application of tactics to influence firms. It is highly important for our 
insight in the interplay between activist groups and firms to see that  activist groups not 
only target the behaviour of individual firms as such but also, and maybe even more so, 
strive for industry change. After all, it is at this level that activist groups want to 
establish a change in norms as to what is considered proper corporate conduct. This 
broader focus also necessitates a broader view on conflict since an industry-level 
approach recommends researchers to study  all tactics that  activist  groups  deploy 
within one specific industry, monitoring the role of different activist groups’ tactics 
within these processes (see Whittier, 2004). 
Although our analysis provides support to these ideas, several issues remain. First, it 
would be useful to delve deeper in each conflict episode and to determine which activist 
groups exactly are involved in what stage of the conflict; who are they, what do they 
want? This would provide a richer account of the change processes studied, although it 
will not be an easy task to accomplish as not all activities of activist groups are out in 
the open[7]. To fully appreciate the impact of industry-level conflicts, looking at the 
industry structure in greater detail would also be useful. In the global apparel industry, 
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for instance,  subcontracting  is important, competition is fierce and trade policies are 
highly influential and deserve further attention. 
Closely linked, in the literature much attention has already been given to firm-level 
conflicts. Yet, a network perspective on corporate social responsibility (CSR)-activism 
and its implications for institutional change still is lacking. How do individual activist 
groups cooperate on these issues, if they do so at all? What makes these networks 
different from the ones studied elsewhere in social movement literature (Diani and 
McAdam, 2003)? How about co-ordination mechanisms in these increasingly 
transnational  conflicts or tactical overlap across activist groups (Whittier,  2004)? 
Scaling up the analysis from the firm level to the industry level hence invites in social 
network research. 
Furthermore, getting a better overview of the individual activist groups involved in 
these institutional change processes and their relationships also could contribute to a 
further refinement of the conceptualization of conflict we applied, e.g. by differentiating 
among activist groups in terms of their ideological position (Zald, 2000; den Hond and 
de Bakker, 2007). It might be suggested that to some extent ideological position is the 
outcome of the conflict. As Fransen (2010) reminds us, at the very onset of the conflict, 
neither activist groups nor brands could know how solutions might be found, nor what 
their repercussions might be. Hence, it might be argued that the process itself created a 
shift within the movement, with some groups starting to believe that brands might be 
able to solve the problem, and others less so. In terms of the distinction between 
movements relying on ‘‘insider’’ or ‘‘outsider’’ tactics (Andrews,  2001; Taylor and Van 
Dyke,  2004), some became more insider oriented, others  remained more outsider 
oriented. This shift in the population of activist groups might provide an opportunity 
for studying its consequences on movement outcomes (cf. Minkoff, 1997). 
Finally, the different national settings in which the conflicts played out might also have 
had an impact on the development of these conflicts. Local opportunity structures in 
China might have been less favourable for activist groups than those in, for instance, 
Indonesia. Conflicts that were based on China (conflicts 4, 5, and 8) were fairly limited 
compared to those in Indonesia or Vietnam, regardless of which firm was involved. 
Looking into the literature on political opportunity structures might be fruitful in this 
respect (cf. Caraway,  2006). It would also provide more insight on the events 
happening in the supply chains themselves, including the possibility of obstruction and 
retaliation by local management, and offer the opportunity to investigate to what extent 
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the local conflict in the supply chain and its articulation in Western markets are 
connected. 
We conclude by emphasizing once again that an industry-level approach is appropriate 
when studying activist pressure for industry change, because it allows us to observe and 
understand the mutual influence and extension of conflicts across an industry, and 
thereby contributes to understanding transnational activism. 
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NOTES 
1 Since a few years, the adidas group name and brand are written in lower case. In 
2006, the three companies had a cumulative share of the world market of about 
59 per cent (www.fashionunited.nl, accessed March 2006). 
2 The relative lack of attention could result from a desire to focus on the more 
positive aspects  of inter-organizational relations  (Pondy,  1992). Stakeholder 
and  issues management  theories  suggest   that   inter-organizational  conflict  
is  to  be  avoided because – normatively – firms must respect legitimate claims 
of their stakeholders, e.g. by engaging in stakeholder dialogues and issues 
management ( Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
3 Once the conflict has been started, firms may also take the initiative and try to 
pre-empt activist tactics. 
4 In the situations we studied, ‘‘exit’’ is only an option to the challenger. An 
activist group may decide no longer to pursue its challenge, e.g. because it runs 
out of resources, sees alternative opportunities to more effectively realize its 
goals, or out of sheer frustration related to a lack of progress. The challenged, in 
this case the firm, may choose to ignore the challenge but cannot unilaterally 
decide to abandon the conflict. 
5 For reasons of space, we only sketch important characteristics of the three firms 
and the conflicts they have become engaged in, highlighting the interplay 
between activists and firms. An elaborate overview of the cases we analysed and 
the sources we used can be obtained from the authors. 
6 www.reebok.com/Static/global/initiatives/rights/awards/index.html  (accessed  
20  May 2010). 
7 One complication might be in the use of ‘‘gun-behind-the-door’’ tactics by 
activist groups – these tactics will not often be visible but might still be highly 
effective in influencing firms, often through some threat. Research on radical 
forms of activism might provide useful methodological suggestions to craft such 
studies. Thanks to Michelle Micheletti for bringing this point to our attention. 
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